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INTRODUCTION
 
Takeovers and mergers are an integral part of the operation of equity
markets. Both have a profound impact on the interests of shareholders
and society in general. A number of reasons have been offered for
takeovers. One of the reasons is that takeovers serve a corporate
governance function. An active market for corporate control is said to
discipline a company’s board and officers to run the business so as to
maximise the company’s value. A detailed discussion on the rationales
for takeovers is, however, outside the scope of this paper.
It is worth noting that where the board of the target faces a
material conflict of interest in takeovers, it raises the concern
because the board of the target may adopt defensive tactics to avoid
being ousted. The board of the target should not apply defences that
protect management at the expense of shareholders. Due to this
reason, takeovers law does not only regulate takeover activities but
it also focuses on the aspect of governance to ensure that the board
of the target does not abuse its power. This will in turn ensure that
the interest of shareholders, especially the minority, in
circumstances where the control of a company is likely to change, is
protected. This will indirectly protect the integrity of the securities
markets with a view to maintaining investor confidence in the
capital market. Section 217(5) of the Capital Market Services Act
2007 lays down the foundation of the Malaysian takeovers law. As a
general rule, directors are tied up with the fiduciary duties they owe
to a company. In addition to the fiduciary duties provided for in the
Companies Act 1965, the Malaysian Code on Take-Overs and
Mergers 1998 (‘the Code’) prevents the board of the target company
from  taking  action  which  would  have  the  effect  of  frustrating
a takeover bid. It prohibits the board of the target from taking such
 
* The author wishes to thank the Research Management Centre for
funding this research and Puan Natasha Carol Abdullah for her
comments on the earlier draft.
 
10-MLJA Vol6.fm  Page cli  Tuesday, November 23, 2010  11:32 AM
 clii
 
Malayan Law Journal
 
[2010] 6 MLJ
 
actions, whether during the course of an offer or even before the date
of the offer if they have reason to believe that a bona fide offer might be
imminent, unless they have obtained their shareholders’ approval.
 
1
 
This paper seeks to examine in detail the conduct of the board of
the target which may amount to frustration of a takeover bid in
Malaysia. Further, this paper will examine the various conducts which
may constitute unacceptable circumstances in takeovers. In order to
shed some light upon the discussion, the Australian experience on
frustration and unacceptable circumstances will be referred to. This
paper will also discuss the emerging devices in takeovers and mergers
deal which are currently gaining popularity in Malaysia and examine
on whether such devices will amount to a frustrating action. The
discussion thus will focus on deal protection measures which will
include lock-up devices and break fees agreement.
 
THE FOUNDATION OF MALAYSIAN TAKEOVERS LAW
 
Section 217(5) of the Capital Market and Services Act 2007 requires that
the change of control in the company shall take place in an efficient,
competitive and informed market and that shareholders have a
reasonable and equal opportunity to participate in any benefits available
under a takeover offer. This provision resembles s 602(a), (b) and (c) of
the Australian Corporations Act 2001 (‘the Corporation Act’). The
origin of s 602 can be traced to the recommendation made by the
Eggleston Committee. In 1967, the Standing Committee of the Attorney
General in Australia appointed a law advisory committee on company
law chaired by Sir Richard Eggleston. The committee was given a
mandate to inquire into and report on the extent of the protection
afforded to the investing public.
 
2
 
 The Eggleston Committee’s Second
Interim Report identified four principles that came to be known in
Australia as the Eggleston principles which have been incorporated into
the Australian takeover law.
 
3
 
 In Australia, there has been some criticism
of the Eggleston principles. Tony Greenwood observed that the
Eggleston principles ‘were the product of application of Sir Richard
 
1 Section 35 of the Code.
2 Cited in 
 
Ford’s Company Law
 
, (2003), Butterworths: Sydney, (11th Ed)
at para 2.1.0105.
3 They are: 
(1) that the bidder’s identity to be known to the shareholders and
directors;
(2) that the shareholders and directors have a reasonable time in which
to consider the proposal;
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Eggleston’s equity jurisprudence rather than of the economic analysis of
law which has since become fashionable’.
 
4
 
 Greenwood further added
that the requirement in the Australian takeover law of an ‘efficient,
competitive and informed market’ was in fact the contribution of Mr
Leigh Masel, at the time chairman elect of the Australian National
Companies and Securities Commission (‘NCSC’).
 
5
 
 ‘Efficient,
competitive and informed market’ means the market must operate
efficiently without unnecessary costs, have sufficient access to players
and parties should have information.
 
6
 
 Justin Mannolini, for instance
observed that it is difficult to rationalise the Eggleston principles in
terms of economic efficiency.
 
7
 
 He is of the view that the Eggleston
principles epitomise the Australian cultural imperative of a ‘fair go for
all’ and represent ‘a uniquely Australian attempt to address innovations
in takeover practice at the unacceptable end of the creative spectrum’.
 
8
 
FRUSTRATION OF A TAKEOVER BID
 
As a general rule, the board of the target may defend the company
against a takeover. However, they may only do so within their general
duties as directors and exercise their power in the best interest of the
company. The issue on whether the board can resort to a variety of
defences in the face of a takeover have led to debates. In the United
States of America (‘US’), there has been a vigorous debate since 1980s
in relation to hostile takeovers.
 
9
 
 A leading American business writer,
Peter Drucker argued that hostile takeovers are bad for the economy
 
3 (3) that the offeror is required to give such information as is necessary to
enable shareholders to form a judgment on the merits of the proposal
and, in particular, where the offeror offers shares or interest in a
corporation, that the kind of information which would ordinarily be
provided in the prospectuses be furnished to the offeree
shareholders; and
(4) that so far as is practicable, each shareholder should have an equal
opportunity to participate in the benefits offered.
4 Greenwood, Tony, 
 
In addition to Justin Mannolini
 
 (2000) 11 AJCL 308
at p 310.
5
 
Ibid
 
.
6 Sheehy, Benedict, 
 
Australia’s Eggleston Principles in Takeover Law:
Social and Economic Sense?
 
 (2004) 17 AJCL 218 at p 219.
7 Mannolini, Justin, 
 
Convergence or Divergence: Is there a Role for the
Eggleston Principles in a Global M & A Environment?
 
 (2002) 24
Sydney Law Review 336 at p 338.
8
 
Ibid.
 
 
9 See Tomasic, Roman, et al, (2002), 
 
Corporations Law in Australia,
 
(2nd Ed),  The Federation Press: Sydney.
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as they force management into operating with short term horizons in
terms of their financial results.
 
10
 
 Takeover defences became the
reaction of target managements that viewed the hostile takeovers as
splitting up healthy companies that have been in business for ages and
cheating the current shareholders of the real value of their share in the
company. Apart from that, the board of the target have a degree of
freedom to take action in response to a hostile bid which is designed,
in their view, to maximise value for shareholders. This includes
actions designed to encourage auctions for shares in the target even if
those actions frustrates the hostile bidder’s intention.
 
11
WHAT ARE FRUSTRATING ACTIONS AND UNACCEPTABLE
CIRCUMSTANCES IN MALAYSIA?
 
The law restricts the actions which target directors can take in response
to a takeover bid. As mentioned earlier, directors owe fiduciary duties
to the company. In Malaysia, in addition to their fiduciary duties
imposed upon them by the Companies Act 1965, directors involved in
a takeover are subject to duties imposed by the Code. The Code
restricts the ability of the target directors to take measures which may
frustrate an offer once a bona fide offer has been received or becomes
imminent. This reflects the view that in Malaysia, the outcome of a
takeover offer should be left to the shareholders to decide upon.
There are a number of conducts by the board of the target which
may give rise to frustrating actions. A frustrating action occurs when
an action by the board of the target results in the takeover bid to be
withdrawn or lapsed. Those circumstances are spelt out in s 35 of
the Code.
 
12
 
 Section 35 of the Code finds its origin from r 21.1 of the
 
10 Drucker PF, 
 
The Hostile Takeover and Its Discontents
 
, The Frontier of
Management at p 694 cited in Roman Tomasic, et al, 
 
Corporations Law
in Australia
 
 at p 650.
11 See for example, www.aar.com.au/July/Aug issue 2002.
12 Section 35 provides that except in pursuance of a contract already
entered into, the board of the target may not:
(a) issue any authorised but unissued shares of the offeree;
(b) issue or grant options in respect of any unissued shares of the offeree;
(c) create or issue or permit the creation or subscription of any shares of
the offeree;
(d) sell, dispose of or acquire or agree to sell, dispose of or to acquire
assets of the offeree of a material amount; or
(e) enter into or allow any contracts for or on behalf of the offeree to be
entered into otherwise than in the ordinary course of business of the
offeree.
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English Takeover Code. Looking at s 35, it can be observed that any
act by the board of the target may amount to frustration if the end
result would amount to diluting the shareholding of the bidder,
making it difficult and more expensive for the bidder to obtain
control of the target company. The board of the target is also
refrained from disposing any assets of a material amount or the
‘crown jewel’ of the target and from acquiring any assets of a
material amount.
 
13
 
 In these situations, the general approach of the
courts has been to look at the purpose of the action taken by the
board of the target. It would naturally have been impossible to
enumerate all frustrating actions; thus, s 35 is complemented by a
general prohibition which prohibits directors from carrying out or
arranging any transaction other than in the ordinary course of
business of the target company. The board however, is allowed to
engage in any action which is required to be carried out by an
agreement that was entered into prior to the bid and which is not
designed to frustrate the takeover offer or change the activity of the
target.
 
14
 
 Where the action of the board of the target falls under some
other obligation, the commission must be informed and a written
approval from the commission may be obtained.
 
15
 
 Similarly, the
commission may approve any action by the board of the target
which in its view falls under special circumstances.
 
16
 
 When
considering whether any action by the board of the target amounts
to frustration of a bid, the commission will consider whether such
action is acceptable to the bidder.
 
17
 
 Thus, although an action by the
board of the target does not specifically fall under s 35(1), a bidder
may still write to the commission if the act by the board of the target
is perceived to be unacceptable.
It is equally important to note that in order to achieve the
objective of the takeovers law and preserve its spirit, the Code also
prevents the bidder from imposing any defeating condition in its
 
13 In determining whether a disposal or acquisition is of a ‘material
amount’ regard will be given to the ratio of the transaction
consideration to the market value of the equity shares of the target, the
ratio of the relevant assets to the total assets of the target and the ratio
of the operating profit attributable to the relevant assets to the
operating profit of the target. If any of these relative values are 10% or
more, the Securities Commission will consider the amount to be
‘material’. 
14 Section 35(2) of the Code.
15 Section 35(2) of the Code.
16
 
Ibid
 
.
17 Malaysian Code on Take-Overs and Mergers Practice Note 8.1, s 35(6).
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takeover offer, the success of which lies in the sole control of the
bidder.
 
18
 
 It can be observed that based on the foundation of the
Malaysian takeover law, the conduct of the board of the target and
the bidder may violate the spirit of the law in the following
circumstances.
 
19
Where an efficient, competitive and informed market in the
securities is inhibited
 
An informed market is one of the primary goals of any takeover
regulation. Proper disclosure is a cornerstone of a fair and efficient
market, as both depend upon investors’ ability to make informed
decisions. A false market, a deficiency of information or the premature
lock out of rival bids would often lead to unacceptable circumstances.
Competition or an auction for control should, however be viewed as
desirable on the basis that the highest bidder is assumed to be able to
use the target’s assets most efficiently.
 
Where there is misinformation
 
Where holders do not have the information necessary to make an
informed decision or are misled about the transaction, unacceptable
circumstances occur. Lack of information and misleading
information will harm the holders of securities. Thus, the absence of
particular issues relating to disclosure of the identity of parties
concerning their interests in a company or any misleading
information may result in unacceptable circumstances. This will
cover situations relating to the intentions of the bidder concerning
the future relations between the target and the current shareholders.
It is worth noting that the reuse of reports obtained for a different
purpose can also lead to misinformation if it is not clear on who was
responsible for the report and to whom the report had intended to
advice. 
 
Where reasonable and equal opportunities are inhibited
 
Where holders of voting shares do not have reasonable and equal
opportunities to participate in the benefits accruing to holders of
 
18 Section 18 of the Code.
19 A similar classification in relation to types of unacceptable
circumstances is discussed in 
 
Guidance Note 1: Unacceptable
Circumstances
 
, Takeovers Panel, 4th Issue, 18 April 2008.
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shares in the target company, it results in unacceptable
circumstances. The holders of the securities should be allowed an
adequate time to consider, sell or vote in relation to the takeover bid.
Further, the shareholders should get equal value in relation to the
price of securities. Relying on this principle, conduct by the directors
of a target that frustrates a bid can deprive target shareholders of an
opportunity to share in the benefits of that bid. Shareholders of a
company may also be deprived of an equal opportunity if securities in
a target are acquired by an associate of the target or its directors as
part of a defence to a takeover bid. 
 
ACTIONS BY DIRECTORS TO FRUSTRATE A TAKEOVER BID: A
PROPER PURPOSE
 
In addition to the board’s duty to exercise powers in the best
interests of the company, it is equally important for the board to
exercise power for proper purpose. When dealing with the issuance
of new shares, it is important to see whether such action will
frustrate a takeover bid. In 
 
Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd and others
 
,
 
20
 
 the
board of the target placed a large block of stock in a trust fund
established for the benefit of the company’s employees. Despite the
fact that the court accepted that the board of the target had no
unworthy motives and was acting on an honest belief that the
scheme was for the interest of the company, the court found the
act to constitute an improper purpose given that the purpose of
the placement of the shares was to block potential bidders. In
 
Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd and others
 
,
 
21
 
 where the
company issued shares which had the effect of diluting the majority
stake held by two of the company’s shareholders to remove their
majority in an attempt to block a bid for the company by a third
party, the court held that the issue was not for a proper purpose.
The decisions show that an issue of shares by the directors with the
primary purpose of frustrating a bid will be an improper exercise of
their powers even if the company requires capital as a secondary
purpose. 
 
THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE
 
In Australia, the Takeovers Panel (‘the panel’) is empowered by
s 657A of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 to declare
 
20 [1966] 3 All ER 420 (Ch D).
21 [1974] AC 821 (PC).
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circumstances to be unacceptable. It is worth noting that s 657A was
proposed in view of s 659AA which was designed to make the panel
to be the main forum for resolving disputes about a takeover bid.
Frustration of the bid may give rise to unacceptable circumstances if
the particular circumstances offend against the principle set out in
ss 602 and 657A of the Corporations Act 2001, even if it is otherwise
legal or required for the proper performance of the directors’
duties.
 
22
 
 In such a case, the panel may prevent the target from
proceeding with the frustrating action, unless it has first been
approved at a general meeting of target shareholders, or the
target has taken some action to avoid the action from being
unacceptable.
 
23
 
In formulating its approach, the panel has sought not to be
prescriptive. Rather, it seeks to provide the market with guidance as
to relevant consideration the panel will take into account when
assessing whether triggering action by the target gives rise to actual or
potential unacceptable circumstances.
 
24
 
 Section 602 sets out the
foundation and purposes of Chapter 6 which relates to takeovers. The
panel’s power to declare circumstances to be unacceptable is also
very wide and does not require it to decide that anyone had caused
the relevant circumstances or carries any blame for them.
 
25
 
 A state of
affairs may be unacceptable due to inadvertence, despite the best of
intentions.
 
26
 
What are unacceptable circumstances?
 
There is no definition for unacceptable circumstances in the
Australian Corporations Act 2001. Whether the action gives rise to
 
22
 
Frustrating Action Guidance Note: Draft for Public Comment
 
,
Takeovers Panel, 31 May 2002 at p 1. It is worth noting that in 2001, the
panel came up with a new rule in relation to conduct by the board
which may have a significant effect on the conduct of a target’s business
once a bid is announced. See also Armson, Emma, 
 
The Frustrating
Action Policy: Shifting Power in A Takeover Context
 
, (2003) Company
and Securities Law Journal, Vol 21 at p 487; Ian Ramsay et al, 
 
Corporate
Governance and Anti-Takeover Devices: Evidence from Australia
 
(2000), Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol 8, Issue 3
at pp 227–243.
23
 
Ibid
 
. 
24
 
Ibid
 
.
25
 
Guidance Note 1: Unacceptable Circumstances
 
, Australian
Government, Takeovers Panel. 
26
 
Ibid
 
.
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unacceptable circumstances will depend on its effect on
shareholders and the market in the light of s 602(a), (b) and (c) and
s 657A. Section 602(a) requires that acquisition of control shall take
place in an efficient, competitive and informed market. Section
602(b) on the other hand incorporates the Eggleston principles with
minor modifications to include holders of ‘interests’ and not just
shareholders.
 
27
 
 Section 602(c) also incorporates the Eggleston
principles which requires that the holders of the voting shares
should receive reasonable and equal opportunity to participate in
any benefits following a takeover offer. Section 602(d) is an
additional principle added to s 602 which requires the compliance
with an appropriate procedure as a preliminary to compulsory
acquisition. Further, when making a declaration of unacceptable
circumstances, s 657A(2) requires the panel to consider whether
making the declaration is not against the public interests after taking
into account any policy considerations that the panel considers
relevant. To summarise, the panel’s role in declaring circumstances
unacceptable applies to a situation where the spirit of Chapter 6 is
breached.
It is worth noting that the panel may declare the circumstances to
be unacceptable whether or not the circumstances constitute a
contravention of a provision of the Act.
 
28
 
 Section 657A requires the
panel to consider the effect of the circumstances and whether the
effect appears to the panel to be unacceptable having regard to the
control or potential control of a company,
 
29
 
 or having regard to the
acquisition or proposed acquisition of a substantial interest in a
company.
 
30
 
 
 
Examples of unacceptable circumstances in Australia
 
In 2002, the Takeovers Panel issued a Guidance Note to explain the
possible circumstances which amount to unacceptable circumstances.
 
27 Section 602(b) reads ‘the holders of the shares or interests, and the
directors of the company or body or the responsible entity for the
scheme:
(i) know the identity of any person who proposes to acquire a
substantial interests in the company, body or scheme; and
(ii) have a reasonable time to consider the proposal; and
(iii) are given enough information to enable them to assess the merits of
the proposal. ...’
28 Section 657A(1) of the Corporations Act 2001.
29 Section 657A(2)(a)(i) of the Corporations Act 2001.
30 Section 657A(2)(a)(ii) of the Corporations Act 2001.
 
10-MLJA Vol6.fm  Page clix  Tuesday, November 23, 2010  11:32 AM
 clx
 
Malayan Law Journal
 
[2010] 6 MLJ
 
The circumstances include the issuing of new shares or repurchasing
shares, if significant in the context of the target’s issued capital and
the structure of the bid and the issuing of securities convertible into
bid class securities or options over bid class securities. It also includes
the acquisition or disposition of a major asset of the target. Obviously,
these actions will dilute the shareholding of the bidder, making it
difficult for the bidder to acquire control in the target and causing the
target to lose its crown jewel or attractiveness. Further, unacceptable
circumstances occur where the target undertakes significant liabilities
(eg guaranteeing parent company debt) or declares a special or
abnormally large dividend. The same occurs where the company
changes its share plan.
 
31
 
 The board of the target will not give rise to
unacceptable circumstances by undertaking a triggering action that is
part of the ordinary course of its business or by carrying out
agreements which were entered into or announced before the bid
was made known to the company. 
 
EMERGING DEVICES GIVING RISE TO UNACCEPTABLE
CIRCUMSTANCES
 
Presently, there are new devices that have been introduced into a
merger and takeover deal which are known as ‘deal protection’
measures.
 
32
 
 The protection measures include lock-up devices and
break fees. It is important to examine whether the usage of these
devices will amount to unacceptable circumstances. In Australia,
Guidance Note 7 provides guidance when dealing with key deal
protection measures which include break fees, asset lock-ups, no-talk
agreements and no-shop agreements.
 
33
 
 The panel states that it does
not regard lock-up devices to be prima facie unacceptable. However,
they may be unacceptable if they prevent the acquisition of control
taking place in an efficient, competitive and informed market or if
they result in shareholders not having reasonable and equal
opportunity to participate in the benefits resulting from the proposed
bid.
 
31
 
Frustrating Action Guidance Note: Draft for Public Comment
 
,
Takeovers Panel, 31 May 2002 at p 8.
32 The latest incidence reported in Malaysia on lock-up devices concerns
Hong Leong Bank and EonCap proposed takeover. 
33
 
Guidance Note 7: Lock-up devices
 
, Australia Government, Takeovers
Panel.
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Lock-up devices
 
A lock-up is an arrangement or transaction by which the target
corporation gives one proposed acquirer a competitive advantage
over other bidders or prospective bidders.
 
34
 
 Usually, a potential
bidder will include in a confidentiality agreement certain clauses
designed to limit the potential for competing bids to emerge. These
clauses reduce the bidder’s risk that the target will not complete the
control transaction.
 
35
 
 They may help secure a proposal by protecting
against opportunity and expended costs that would not be
recoverable if the transaction becomes unsuccessful.
 
36
 
 However,
these protection measures may deter rival bidders as it would
discourage a target from seeking or accepting alternative bids,
resulting in less auction occurring in takeover activities. Whether any
lock-up device gives rise to unacceptable circumstances in Australia
will depend on its effect or likely effect.37 Lock-up devices may
amount to frustration if it offends ss 602 and 657A. The panel in
Australia requires immediate disclosure of the existence and nature of
any lock-up device. Apart from disclosure made to the stock
exchange, the existence and nature of the break fee should also be
disclosed in the bidder’s statement or the offer document and the
target’s statement. It is worth noting, however that in the US, lock-up
devices are used widely and play a major role in the US acquisition
deal. 
34 See Note: Lock-up options: Toward a State Law Standard, 96 Harv Law
Review 1068.
35 Consultation Paper, Rewrite of: GN 7 Lock-up devices, GN 12
Frustrating action, GN 14 Funding arrangements and GN 17 Rights
Issues,  Australia Government, Takeovers Panel, 13 May 2009 at p 6. 
36 Guidance Note 7, Lock-up devices, Australia Government, Takeovers
Panel at p 3.
37 Guidance Note 7 on lock-up arrangement applies to any control
transaction. The relevant factors which the panel may consider include: 
(a) the stage the transaction had reached when the device was
negotiated;
(b) whether other interests had been canvassed;
(c) the bargaining power of each party;
(d) the size and complexity of the transaction;
(e) the likely (opportunity and expended) costs involved; and
(f) ancillary provisions in the agreement. 
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Asset lock-up
An asset lock-up involves the grant of an option to a potential bidder
to buy a major asset of the target company. This arrangement will
make the target company unattractive to the bidder. If an asset
lock-up inhibits the principle of an efficient, competitive and
informed market, it is likely to be unacceptable.38 
Break fees or inducement fees
A break fee or an inducement fee may be viewed as an option fee
paid to secure a proposal for a target to consider. The inducement
fee arrangements may sometimes be reciprocal. The terms of the
inducement fee will specify the circumstances in which the fee will
be payable. Most commonly, the inducement fee will be payable by
the target company in the context of a competing bid. It will be a
matter for negotiation whether an announcement of the competing
proposal is sufficient to trigger payment of the break fee, such as a
change in the target board’s recommendation or a breach of a non-
solicitation obligation. It is worth noting that the target’s
shareholders may be critical of a break fee which is payable by the
target company if an offer fails in the absence of a competing
proposal or any breach of undertaking by the directors of the target
company. Break fee agreements have traditionally been entered into
immediately prior to the takeover being agreed and announced.
However, break fees are now entered into at an earlier stage in the
process to compensate a thwarted bidder for its wasted costs if it
does not get to the offer stage. A conventional announcement stage
break fee will be payable if the potential bidder does not announce
an offer because the target board refuses to recommend it or decides
to recommend a third party offer. The revised Guidance Note 7
38 Guidance Note 7, Lock-up devices, Australia Government, the
Takeovers Panel provides that in considering whether an asset lock-up
gives rise to unacceptable circumstances, the panel may consider the
following:
(a) the commercial reason for it;
(b) the size or strategic value of the asset involved;
(c) whether the agreement was negotiated on an arms-length basis;
(d) the safeguards in place;
(e) whether the agreement was at a fair price;
(f) its effect on the amount of, or distribution of benefits to, shareholders
in the target in connection with the takeover; and
(g) the timing of entry into the agreement and the lengths of the lock-
up.
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provides that break fees be capped at the equivalent to 1% of the
equity value of a deal. It is also worth noting that before entering
into a break fee agreement, the board of the target may need to
obtain an independent valuation advice. Generally, in considering
whether a frustrating action gives rise to unacceptable
circumstances, the panel will take into consideration certain
considerations surrounding the bid and those surrounding the
frustrating actions.39
CONCLUSION
The Malaysian takeovers and mergers law are found in policies which
focus on an efficient, competitive and informed market. The law also
confers the right upon shareholders to have a reasonable and equal
opportunity to participate in any benefits which may accrue under the
takeover. Therefore, the board of the target cannot simply act to
defeat or delay a takeover bid. Thus, it is very important for the law to
preserve a balance between the duty of directors to carry out
transactions in the interests of the company on the one hand and the
right of shareholders not to have the bid unnecessarily frustrated. In
Australia, the panel can declare circumstances unacceptable where
the transaction during the course of a takeover would be one which
is designed primarily to frustrate a takeover bid or contravene the
spirit of takeovers law. The Malaysian law on the other hand, identifies
39 Considerations surrounding the bid will include:
(a) how long the bid has been open and its likelihood of success;
(b) any clearly stated objectives of the bidder and whether the condition
is commercially critical to the bid;
(c) whether it is ‘unreasonable’ for the bidder to rely on the condition
before the panel;
(d) whether the bidder can waive the condition; and
(e) the market price compared to the bid price. 
On the other hand, considerations surrounding the frustrating actions,
among others, include:
(a) whether there is a competing proposal already;
(b) whether the frustrating action was undertaken by the target in the
ordinary course of its business;
(c) whether the frustrating action materially affects the financial or
business position of the target; and
(d) how advanced the negotiations on the frustrating action were when
the bid was made or communicated.
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the transactions that cannot be carried out without the shareholders’
approval once the takeover bid becomes imminent or during the bid
period. Despite the different approaches adopted in Malaysia and in
Australia, it is observed that both approaches would bring the same
outcome. It will allow a balance between the ability of directors to
pursue transactions to maximise the interests of the company and the
right of the shareholders to be able to consider the takeover bid. Since
Malaysia applies a restrictive approach, ie by laying down the list of
actions which the board of the target should refrain from doing, it is
worth noting that any action by the board of the target which goes
beyond the list may amount to frustration and circumstances
unacceptable to the bidder where the spirit of the law is violated. It is
also worth noting that in Malaysia, the commission has the power
under s 217(5) of the Capital Market Services Act 2007 which allows
it to act more quickly to intervene any act which may give rise to a
frustrating action following its role of administering, monitoring
compliance and enforcing the rule contained in the Code and the
spirit of the takeover law.
When dealing with competing bids, which especially involves a
hostile bid, the target directors’ action will generally be acceptable
where they effectively give shareholders the choice between
competing proposals. As regard to the emerging device in takeovers,
it must be noted that the deal protection measures should not
frustrate the bid. In relation to break fee agreements, they should be
permitted only where they are designed to maximise shareholders’
wealth but not otherwise. Policy makers should adopt shareholders’
welfare enhancement as the criterion for developing the applicable
rules in this area.
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